Passo Grande dei Rondòi/Wildgrabenjoch - Written in the landscape

The war at high altitude required considerable logistical and material effort for the care of the wounded and sick. In the high mountains there were only first aid structures, while intermediate structures, more spacious and organized, were located in the valley floor. For the most serious cases, transfer to military hospitals in territories even farther away from the front was organized. In addition to historical photographs, there remain recollections of the health infrastructure and biographies of doctors who worked at the front or who visited it.
For many, religiosity played an important role in making the harshness of war bearable. The private one, of the individual soldiers, can be reconstructed with extreme difficulty through some objects or personal diaries. The rites of official religiosity, on the other hand, are well documented by photographs, drawings and written sources. These sources show that religiosity itself was often exploited for propaganda purposes and to support the war effort. Parish priests and chaplains, such as Feldkurat Josef Hosp on the Austrian side and Don Pietro Zangrando on the Italian side, supported with conviction the causes of their respective staffs, to the extent that they intervened at times: on the front, faith and patriotism were closely intertwined.
The general staff prepared numerous cemeteries for the fallen. At high altitude, there were emergency cemeteries, in some cases located near the front lines. Time has left barely visible traces of these places. On the Austro-Hungarian front, the cemetery of Toblingerdörfl and that of Zirbenboden are known, both well documented by photographs of the time. Between the two wars, the remains of the soldiers were exhumed and moved to the large cemeteries dedicated to the fallen, in ossuaries or in village tombs, partly for ideological and political reasons. (GF, SK)

The landscape that characterizes the area on which the research of the Written on the Landscape project focused is the Dolomite medium and high mountains, upon which military structures and infrastructures were grafted. From a naturalistic point of view, a monographic report of the Italian I Army Corps of 1917 proves to be particularly revealing, in which we read: “The region in question is part of the Dolomite Alps, of which it forms the extreme eastern edge, and, in this region, the characters of the Triassic formation are very marked, with local tectonic disturbances […]. The phenomena of erosion have acted intensely on dolomite, a constituent element of these rocks, so as to form irregular and steep slopes, furrowed by deep gullies. The typical example of the intensity of this erosion is given by the Tre Cime di Lavaredo; and where erosion has manifested itself most, shales and sandstones have been laid bare.”
The report is very detailed and also focuses on the intricate situation of water: “From the orographic complexity of the region results, by natural consequence, a corresponding hydrographic complexity, and it is noteworthy that in a relatively small area there are watercourses unfolding in different and opposite directions. Thus, while the Rio Marzon, the Rio Cengia and the Rio Giralba all have the general north-south direction, the Bacher Bach goes from south to north; and while the Boden Bach runs from west to east, the Schwarze Rienz [Rienza Nera] descends from east to west.” This is followed by climatic considerations, in which the minimum winter temperatures that have been recorded can drop to -30° C, and insights on the vegetation, ranging from coniferous forest, to mountain forest, to rhododendron.1Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma, Monografie del I Corpo d’Armata – Genio – Sistemazione difensiva, AUSSME_B1_110D_23A.
A complex natural landscape, therefore, that did not make life at high altitude easy for the hundreds of men who faced each other for twenty-nine months, summer and winter, in the Dolomites. (GF)

For the soldiers who found themselves fighting on the Three Peaks Plateau, winters were long and snowy. The snow fell from October to April and could last until late June in the shaded areas of the highest peaks. The minimum temperature often dropped to -30°C at night, hovering around 0°C during the day.
Frostbite and avalanches soon became familiar dangers. To help the soldiers survive in such conditions, both staffs provided detailed equipment and instructions. Each Italian soldier, for example, received two sets of woolen garments and three heavy blankets. The troops in the trenches also received coats and shoes lined with fur, clogs, balaclavas, leg wraps, socks, waterproof clothing and sleeping bags. To avoid frostbite, antioxidant fat was distributed to spread on the feet. To limit the damage caused by avalanches, officers from both armies had maps at their disposal showing the points most likely to cause snow loss. Despite this, the winter at high altitude resulted in hundreds of victims.
As time went on, the general staffs began to take advantage of winter conditions. The attack on Sasso di Sesto/Sextenstein on 21 April 1917 is a clear example of this. The approach of members of the Austro-Hungarian army to the Italian lines took place through a tunnel dug hundreds of meters in the snow. This tunnel made it possible to catch the sentinels by surprise and temporarily conquer the position. It also required the training of departments specialized in the use of winter equipment, including skis used for stealth and surprise attacks as well as sleds for the transport of materials. (GF)

The Pass, located on the far right of the Three Peaks area of operations, represented a stronghold of the Austrian defensive deployment from the early days of the conflict, when it was occupied by a platoon of the Landesschützen. On August 19, 1915, the Italians tried to conquer it with three companies of the 55th Infantry Regiment, but the defenders managed to repel them. Later, the location was fortified with caves, machine gun emplacements and trenches.1Kübler and Reider, Kampf um die Drei Zinnen, pp. 104-105.
A report of the Italian I Army Corps included the following: “Through a steep valley, opposite our Forcella dell’Arghena, one ascends to the yoke of the Gross Wildgraben [Passo Grande dei Rondòi], direct communication route from the Rienz Nera to the Innerfeld [Val Campo di Dentro]. The line of trenches that blocks the pass leans, on the one hand, on the inaccessible rocks of the Schwalbenkopf [Torre dei Scarperi], on the other hand on the tower of the Schwalbenalpenkopf [Croda dei Rondòi], another highly organized position equipped with artillery inside a cave”.2Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma, Monografie del I Corpo d’Armata – Genio – Sistemazione difensiva, AUSSME_B1_110D_23A.
The Italians, after the failed attack of August 1915, planned new raids in the following years, as evidenced by a feasibility study of the winter of 1916-19173Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma, Diario I Corpo d’Armata, AUSSME_B1_110D_7A, 6 febbraio 1917. but the lack of ski battalions and mobile artillery, in addition to the position of the pass, advised against proceeding with the operations. They simply hit the position at a distance.4Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma, Diario Comando Lavaredo-Oberbacher, AUSSME_B1_130s_88e, 20 agosto 1916.
In January 1916, the 4th Company of the 59th Infantry Regiment “Erzherzog Rainer” moved with a platoon of soldiers to the positions of the Passo Grande dei Rondòi. There, from February 8 to 14, they experienced daily and increasing artillery fire from Italian batteries in the Rinbianco Valley to the south. According to the diary of the regiment, at the height of the bombing, with hundreds of bullets fired in a few hours, half of all Italian ammunition fired did not explode and, except for an abandoned barrack that was hit, did no significant damage. After days of bombardment, on 15 February the company was relieved by the 3rd Company and transferred to the Schusterhütte to regain strength.5Kriegsarchiv Wien, Kriegstagebuch des Infanterieregiments 59, Einträge vom 08., 10. - 15.2.1916, pp. 160-165.

(GF)

Kübler, Peter and Hugo Reider (1997). Kampf um die Drei Zinnen. Das Herzstück der Sextener Dolomiten 1915-1917 und heute. Bozen: Athesia.

Monografie del I Corpo d’Armata – Genio – Sistemazione difensiva, AUSSME_B1_110D_23A, Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma.

Kriegsarchiv Wien, Kriegstagebuch des Infanterieregiments 59, Einträge vom 08., 10. – 15.2.1916, S. 160-165.

Diario I Corpo d’Armata, AUSSME_B1_110D_7A, Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma.

Diario Comando Lavaredo-Oberbacher, AUSSME_B1_130s_88e, Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma.

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