Aeronautical innovations in the years before the conflict represented the prelude to the remarkable development of aviation for war purposes between 1914 and 1918. In the first six months of hostilities, however, air activity was limited to unarmed reconnaissance; this was due in part to the technological limits of airplanes during the period and their small number (in 1915 there were about eighty on the whole front including both the Italian and Austro-Hungarian sides).1Hauke and Tötschinger, Die Flugzeuge der k.u.k. Luftfahrtruppe und Seeflieger, 1914-1918. Military leaders, moreover, still tied to nineteenth-century combat tactics, continued to be wary of the actual use of air vehicles. Originally, the missions entrusted to the air force were for visual reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment support. Later, powerful cameras installed on aircraft made it possible to visually document enemy lines, fortifications, and rear positions. Sometimes, the planes were used to send messages to the enemy, as shown by this extract from the diary of the Italian I Army Corps of May 1916: “This morning at about nine o’clock an enemy airplane wandered over our positions and was hit by some anti-aircraft shots. Returning in the afternoon around 5 p.m., the plane dropped a note on Auronzo written in red pencil in German with the following contents, translated verbatim: ‘Every shot towards Innichen [San Candido] will be reciprocated with airplane bombs on Auronzo.’ The airplane was again targeted by our anti-aircraft fire.”2Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma, Diario del 1° Corpo d’Armata, 4 maggio 1916. The success of the missions was influenced by factors such as the reliability of the aircraft, weather conditions and the presence in the target area of anti-aircraft artillery that could hit the reconnaissance aircraft. Between 3 and 5 June 1916, the aforementioned diary reads: “At 10 am an enemy aircraft descended to a low altitude and performed machine gun volleys against our corvee in Pian di Cengia [Bullelejoch], Pian di Lavaredo, Col di Mezzo. No damage. Winds NE weak”;3Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma, Diario del 1° Corpo d’Armata, 4 maggio 1916, 3 giugno 1916. and then, two days later: “10 o’clock. Enemy aircraft again tries to strafe our troops. Targeted with artillery, machine gun and rifle fire falls vertically in front of the first houses of Moos (Sextental) [Moso, Valle di Sesto]”.4Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma, Diario del 1° Corpo d’Armata, 5 giugno 1916.
Batchelor, John and Christopher Chant (1992). Storia illustrata dell’aviazione. Milano: De Agostini.
Hauke, Erwin, Schroeder Walter and Tötschinger Bernhard (1988). Die Flugzeuge der k.u.k. Luftfahrtruppe und Seeflieger, 1914-1918. Gnas: H. Weishaupt Verlag.
Diario del 1° Corpo d’Armata, Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma.
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