The new battlefront in the Dolomites was unprecedented territory for both sides of the conflict. For the first time in history, modern warfare was carried out over an extended period of time in the high mountains. Neither soldiers nor weapons were ready for positions in inaccessible and nearly impervious altitudes. First of all, transport routes and facilities had to be built, which required meticulous work carried out mostly on the Austrian side with the help of Russian and Serbian prisoners of war. For the first time, new technologies were used, such as the telephone, which made it possible to establish a permanent connection between front-line positions and rear command. Since the enemy could attempt to sabotage communications or intercept lines, soldiers were strictly forbidden from mentioning sensitive data in telephone conversations before planned actions, or at least it was necessary to speak in “encrypted language” with a precise code. The observation of the enemy could now be carried out with innovative technological means, such as aerial reconnaissance, but also with searchlights and lighting systems in the high mountains.
In these years, anti-aircraft systems were also born, which tried to hinder such reconnaissance or attacks from above. Even the searchlights became frequent targets for bombing, or were disturbed with other beams of light to obscure them. In addition to telephones, other communication systems were also experimented with, such as the heliograph, a sort of telegraph that exploited Morse code by sending flashes of light directed through mirrors.1Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma, Diario Brigata Marche, AUSSME_B1_133S_583c, 10 agosto 1915.
However, the effects of modern artillery and mountain guns became increasingly dangerous to soldiers’ lives. Unlike what happened on the eastern and western fronts, grenade fire in a rocky environment was much more dangerous, since falling debris and shrapnel could cause equally fatal injuries.
The effects and consequences of artillery fire on enemy positions have been carefully observed and documented. The diary of the 59 Infantry Regiment “Erzherzog Rainer” describes how an artillery attack and counterattack of this type took place: “December 30, 1915: At three o’clock in the morning a patrol consisting of Captain Petritsch and two artillerymen climbs to the top of the Toblinger Knoten [Toblin Tower], establishes the telephone connection and directs the mountain howitzer and the fourth gun, that starting at 5 am open fire on the Sextenstein [Sasso di Sesto] completely breaking down the defenses. […] The defense troop of the Sextenstein [Sasso di Sesto], composed of about forty men, hastily abandons the positions and retreats to the southern slope of the Sextenstein [Sasso di Sesto]. It is assumed that the Italians were carrying wounded, having observed people being grounded by others. At six o’clock in the morning our fire ceases. The Italian battery of Paternsattel [Forcella Lavaredo] returns fire with about twenty shots against the Toblinger Knoten [Torre di Toblin], without success. At 8:30 the Italians cautiously resume their positions”.2Kriegsarchiv Wien, Kriegstagebuch des Infanterieregiments 59, Eintrag vom 30.12.1915, p. 131.
The diary of the VIII Bersaglieri Regiment of the Italian army, on the same day, confirms in a laconic tone the losses: “The enemy artillery fire on the Sasso di Sesto [Sextenstein] wounds eight bersaglieri, of which one died after a few hours”.3Archivio dell’Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Roma, Diario dell’VIII Reggimento Bersaglieri, AUSSME_B1_137S_1748c, 30 dicembre 1915.